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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cullen Robert Sims appeals from the district court's orders denying his 
Rule 35 motions for credit for time served. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While on parole for unlawful possession of a firearm and other felony 
crimes, Sims absconded supervision. (PSI, p.52. 1) On August 9, 2012, several 
members of a multi-agency fugitive task force located Sims and attempted to 
arrest him on a "no-bond parole violation warrant." (PSI, pp.49-50, 52.) Sims 
fled from the officers, led them on a high-speed vehicle chase and caused an 
injury crash. (PSI, p.3.) When officers approached Sims at the scene of the 
crash, they observed a small bag of methamphetamine in his mouth. (PSI, p.3.) 
Sims swallowed the methamphetamine and lost consciousness. (PSI, p.98.) He 
was taken into custody and transported to the hospital for treatment of his 
injuries and drug overdose. (PSI, pp.3, 23, 61.) 
On October 17, 2012, the state filed a criminal complaint charging Sims 
with two offenses - felony eluding a peace officer and misdemeanor resisting or 
obstructing officers - both of which arose out of his conduct on August 9, 2012. 
(R., pp.7-9.) An arrest warrant issued and was served on Sims on November 21, 
2012. (R., pp.10, 19-20.) On January 16, 2013, the state filed an amended 
complaint charging Sims with felony eluding, aggravated driving under the 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"Sims PSI.PDF." 
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influence (DUI), possession of methamphetamine, felony destruction, alteration 
or concealment of evidence, and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing officers. 
(R., pp.59-61.) Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound Sims over 
on all but the destruction of evidence charge, and the state filed a corresponding 
Information. (R., pp.56-58, 62-67.). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sims pied 
guilty to aggravated DUI and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., 
pp.98-106, 110.) The district court accepted Sims' plea and imposed a unified 
sentence of 15 years, with 7 ½ years fixed. (R., pp.98, 110-12.) The court gave 
Sims credit for the 191 days he had served between his arrest on November 21, 
2012 and his sentencing hearing on May 30, 2013. (R., p.112.) 
After he was sentenced, Sims sent the court a handwritten letter 
requesting that he be given credit for a total of 295 days served because, he 
contended, he had been arrested on the aggravated DUI charge on August 9, 
2012. (R., p.123.) The district court treated Sims' letter as a Rule 35 motion for 
credit for time served and denied it (R., pp.121-22), reasoning: 
From the Court's review of the jail records and the court file, Mr. 
Sims was not arrested on these charges until November 21, 2012. 
The Defendant may have been in custody on some other charge or 
some other case, but all of the records indicate that an arrest 
warrant in this case was not even issued until October 17, 2012 
and he was at large for at least another month before his arrest. 
(R., p.122). Sims thereafter filed a prose motion for credit for time served and 
affidavit and attachments in support thereof, again asserting he was arrested for 
the aggravated DUI of which he was convicted in this case on the same day he 
committed it - August 9, 2012. (R., pp.125-33.) The district court denied the 
motion (R., pp.134-35), ultimately concluding, 'The matters submitted by the 
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Defendant do not show that Mr. Sims was incarcerated on the date of the 
incident and the court file shows his arrest on November 21, 2012" (R., p.135). 
Sims filed a notice of appeal timely from the court's orders denying his motions 
for credit for time served. (R., pp.136-39.) 
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ISSUE 
Sims states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Sims' motion for credit 
for time served? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Sims failed to show the district court erred in denying his requests for 
credit for time served? 
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,llRGUMEl'JT 
Sims Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Requests For Credit For 
Time Served 
A. Introduction 
Sims challenges the denial of his motions for credit for time served, 
arguing as he did below that he is entitled to credit for the time he spent "in 
custody" between August 9, 2012 - the date he committed the underlying 
offense - and November 21, 2012 - the date he was served with the arrest 
warrant. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-10.) There is no doubt that Sims was in custody 
between August 9, 2012 and November 21, 2012. Contrary to Sims' assertions, 
however, the record supports the district court's finding that Sims was not in 
custody or otherwise incarcerated on the offense to which he pied guilty in this 
case until he was served with the arrest warrant on November 21, 2012. Sims 
has failed to show error in the denial of his motions for credit for time served. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous." 
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State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731,734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
C. The Record Supports The District Court's Finding That Sims Was Not 
Incarcerated On The Aggravated DUI Charge Until The Service Of The 
Arrest Warrant On November 21, 2012 
The award of credit for time served is governed by I.C. § 18-309, which 
provides in relevant part: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom 
the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for 
any period of incarceration prior to the entry of judgment, if such 
incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which 
the judgment was entered. The remainder of the term commences 
upon the pronouncement of the sentence .... 
(Emphasis added). The italicized phrase means that the right to credit is 
conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration is a consequence of or 
attributable to the charge or conduct for which the sentence is imposed. State v. 
Horn, 124 Idaho 849,850,865 P.2d 176,177 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hale, 116 
Idaho 763, 765, 779 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, when a 
defendant seeks credit for prejudgment incarceration, "the applicable inquiry is 
whether the incarceration was for the same offense or an included offense for 
which the judgment was entered." State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 399, 179 
P.3d 360, 362 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing I.C. § 18-309; State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 
67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005)); see also l.C. § 20-209A ("A 
person who is sentenced may receive credit toward service of his sentence for 
time spent in physical custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that 
detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was 
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imposed." (emphasis added)). "If a particular period of confinement served prior 
to the imposition of sentence is not attributable to the charge or conduct for 
which a sentence is to be imposed, the offender is not entitled to credit for such 
confinement; neither does the sentencing judge err by denying credit under such 
circumstances." State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765, 779 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 
1989) (citations omitted). 
Applying the plain language of I. C. § 18-309 to the facts of this case, the 
district court correctly concluded Sims was not entitled to credit toward his 
sentence for any time he spent in custody before November 21, 2012, because 
such incarceration was not attributable to the aggravated DUI charge of which he 
was convicted in this case. (R., pp.121-22, 134-35.) The record shows that, on 
August 9, 2012, Sims committed the aggravated DUI while attempting to elude 
authorities who were endeavoring to arrest him on a "no-bond parole violation 
warrant." (R., pp.65-67; PSI, pp.3, 23, 27, 48-52, 61, 88-89.) After Sims 
crashed his vehicle, he "was taken into custody on his outstanding IDOC fugitive 
warrant and transported to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical [C]enter where he 
was treated and released" to "[s]taff from the Idaho Department of Corrections" 
who "transported Sims to prison." (PSI, p.61.) Although a police report attached 
to Sims' motion for credit for time served indicates Sims was also taken into 
"custody" for "felony eluding" on August 9, 2012 (R., p.133; see also PSI, p.23), 
the record unequivocally shows the charges in this case were not even filed until 
October 17, 2012, and Sims was not arrested on those charges until November 
21, 2012 (R., pp.2, 7-9, 19-20). Thus, it appears that any time Sims spent 
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incarcerated before November 21, 2012 was attributable solely to his arrest on a 
parole violation in a separate case and not the aggravated DUI charge 
which Sims pied guilty in this case. 
Sims argues otherwise. Relying on the aforementioned police report, a 
transport order entered before his arraignment, and "the portion of [his own] 
affidavits were [sic] he stated that he was in custody for the underlying offense 
from August 9, 2012 until he was senter ·~ed on May 30, 2013," Sims contends 
that "a// of the evidence in the record indicates [he] was in custody for the 
underlying offense from August 9, 2012, until November 21, 2012." (Appellant's 
brief, pp.5-6 (emphasis added).) Sims is incorrect. 
It does appear from the record that Sims was continuously incarcerated 
between August 9, 2012 and November 21, 2012 (thus necessitating the order to 
transport Sims from the Idaho State Penitentiary to the courthouse for his 
arraignment in this case). (R., pp.15-16; PSI, pp.5, 45, 48-49, 61.) But, aside 
from the single statement in the police report upon which he relies and his own 
self-serving and conclusory statements, there is no evidence in the record that 
Sims was in custody on the aggravated DUI charge before November 21, 2012. 
In fact, as already noted above, other evidence in the record compels the 
conclusion that Sims' custodial status between August 9, 2012 and November 
21, 2012 was attributable solely to his arrest on a parole violation, not to the 
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charges in this case. 2 (R., pp.2, 7-9, 19-20; PSI, p.61.) Thus, contrary to Sims' 
asse· ons (see Appellant's brief, pp.5-6, 10), the district court's factual finding 
that he was not in custody for this offense between August 9, 2012 and 
November 21, 2012 is supported by substantial evidence. 
In addition to challenging the district court's factual findings, Sims also 
argues the court erred as a matter of law in concluding that, for purposes of I.C. 
§ 18-309, '"service oft arre~ arrant constitutes incarceration."' (Appellant's 
brief, p.6 (citing R., p.135).) The state acknowledges that the term 
"incarceration" in I. C. § 18-309 generally means "confine[ment] in a prison or 
jail," see State v. Climer, 127 Id;:, o 20, 23, 896 P.2d 346, 349 (Ct. App. 1995), 
or otherwise in the physical custoeiy of prison or jail officials, Taylor v. State, 145 
Idaho 866, 187 P.3d 1241 (Ct. App. 2008). See also I.C. § 20-209A (allowing 
credit toward service of sentence "for time spent in physical custody pending trial 
or sentencing, or appeal, if that detention was in connection with the offense for 
which the sentence was imposed). The question in this case, however, is not 
whether Sims was incarcerated (i.e., in physical custody) between August 9, 
2012 and November 21, 2012 (he clearly was), but whether that incarceration 
was attributable to the aggravated DUI charge to which he pied guilty in this 
case. As to that question, the service of the arrest warrant obviously marks the 
2 The state submits the existing record amply supports the district court's finding 
in this regard. The state notes, however, that in denying Sims' motions, the 
district court indicated it also reviewed the jail records to determine at what point 
Sims was incarcerated on the aggravated DUI charge. (R., pp.122, 135.) Those 
jail records are not currently part of the appellate record and, as such, must be 
presumed to support the district court's decision. Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 
255, 258, 233 P .3d 186, 189 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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of incarceration as it relates the aggravated DUI charge because that is 
date Sims was arrested (i.e., taken into physical custody) in this case. 
That Sims was not incarcerated on the aggravated DUI charge until he 
was served with the arrest warrant on November 21, 2012 is evidenced, at least 
in part, by the fact that he was not arraigned in the charges in the underlying 
case until that date. Rule 5 of the Idaho Criminal Rules mandates that, with 
certain limited exceptions, "[a] defendant arrested, whether or not pursuant to a 
warrant, shall be taken before a magistrate" for an "initial appearance" within the 
first "twenty-four (24) hours following the arrest" I.C.R. 5(a), (b). If, as Sims 
contends, he was arrested in connection with this case on August 9, 2012, he 
would surely have appeared before a magistrate by August 10, 2012, or as soon 
as possible after he was released from the hospital. See !.C.R. 5(b) (court may 
delay initial appearance if defendant hospitalized). Instead, it appears from the 
record that Sims was transported by IDOC officials directly from the hospital to 
the prison to face parole violation proceedings (see PSI, p.61 ), and he appears 
to have remained there until November 21, 2012, the date he was both arrested 
and arraigned on the charges in this case (see R., pp.15-17, 19-20). 
Sims anticipates the state's argument that his "pre-judgment 
incarceration is actually attributable to the service of the arrest warrant for the 
parole violation" - but asks this Court to reject it, contending it "runs afoul" of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 179 P.3d 
360 (Ct. App. 2008). (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) Sims is clearly mistaken. Even 
a cursory review of McCarthy shows it supports the state's position. 
10 
While on probation for possessing methamphetamine, McCarthy twice 
delivered methamphetamine to an undercover officer. McCarthy, 145 Idaho at 
398, 179 P.3d at 361. A bench warrant for a probation violation issued and was 
served on McCarthy on November 9, 2005. 1st While in the county jail awaiting 
disposition of the charged probation violations, McCarthy was charged in a 
separate criminal case with two counts of delivery of methamphetamine, arising 
out of the same allegations that formed the basis of his probation violations. 1st 
An arrest warrant issued and was served on McCarthy at the county jail on 
December 5, 2005. 1st McCarthy ultimately pied guilty to one count of delivery 
of methamphetamine in the new case and admitted to having violated his 
probation in the possession case. 1st "He remained in jail from his November 9, 
2005 arrest on the bench warrant [for the probation violations] until the 
disposition of both cases in a consolidated proceeding on March 8, 2006." 1st 
After he was sentenced, McCarthy sought credit for time served in both 
cases. kl The district court granted the motion in the delivery case and 
awarded McCarthy credit from the service of the arrest warrant on December 5, 
2005. 1st "As to the possession conviction, however, the court denied relief for 
any of McCarthy's incarceration following his November 9, 2005 arrest, stating 
that an individual is not entitled to receive credit for time served on a probation 
violation." kl 
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order 
denying McCarthy's motion for credit for time served on the possession 
sentence, holding McCarthy was entitled to credit toward his sentence for the 
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time he served in jail after his for a probation violation. kl The Court also 
rejected the state's argument "that McCarthy should be credited in the 
possession case only for the period from November 9, when he was arrested for 
the probation violation, to December 5, 2005, when the arrest warrant for the 
new delivery charge was served." kl at 399, 179 P.3d at 362 The Court 
reasoned: 
When it is the same acts that give rise to both warrants for the 
defendant's arrest and the confinement is served simultaneously, it 
cannot be said that the incarceration is uniquely attributable to 
either case individually. Because concurrent sentences were 
imposed here, granting credit on each sentence from the date the 
warrant was served in that case will not give McCarthy credit 
against his prison sentences for more time than he actually served 
in the county jail. Therefore, McCarthy is entitled to credit on his 
possession sentence for his incarceration from November 9, 2005, 
the date of the service of the bench warrant, until the entry of the 
order revoking probation on March 8, 2006. 
kl (emphases added). Importantly, the Court of Appeals treated the date of the 
service of the arrest warrant as the date of incarceration for purposes of I.C. § 
18-309. Also importantly, although McCarthy was continuously incarcerated 
between November 9, 2005 and March 8, 2006, the Court held only that 
McCarthy "was entitled to credit on his possession sentence" for time served 
since the service of the November 9, 2005 bench warrant in the possession 
case; the Court did not even hint that the district court erred in granting McCarthy 
credit in the delivery case only for the time he spent incarcerated since being 
served on December 5, 2005 with the arrest warrant in that case. 
Applying the reasoning of McCarthy to the facts of this case supports the 
district court's determination that Sims was only entitled to credit toward his 
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aggravated DUI sentence for his incarceration from November 21, 2012, the date 
of the service of the arrest warrant in the underlying case, until the entry of 
judgment on May 30, 2013. Sims committed the aggravated DUI on August 9, 
2012, the same day he was arrested on the no-bond parole violation warrant in a 
different case. But like McCarthy, whose arrest in the new case post-dated his 
arrest in his probation violation case, Sims was not arrested on the charges in 
this case until after he had spent three months in prison in connection with the 
parole violation. In other words, while Sims may have committed the acts giving 
rise to the aggravated DUI charge on the same day he was arrested on the 
parole violation, his confinement on the parole violation and the aggravated DUI 
was not served simultaneously. Although it is clear under McCarthy that Sims is 
entitled to credit toward the case in which he violated his parole for the time he 
served since his August 9, 2012 arrest in that case, it is equally clear that he is 
only entitled to credit toward his aggravated DUI sentence for the time he served 
since November 21, 2012, because that is the date he was arrested in 
connection with this case. Sims' arguments to the contrary are without merit. 
The district court correctly applied the law to the facts in concluding Sims 
was only entitled to credit for time served on his aggravated DUI sentence since 
November 21, 2012. Sims has failed to show any basis for reversal. 
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CCNCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders denying Sims' motions for credit for time served. 
DATED this 21 st day of March 2014. 
RI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney G 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21 st day of March 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
LAF/pm 
14 
